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Beyond p-Boxes and Interval-Valued Moments:
Natural Next Approximations to General
Imprecise Probabilities
Olga Kosheleva and Vladik Kreinovich

Abstract To make an adequate decision, we need to know the probabilities of different consequences of different actions. In practice, we only have partial information about these probabilities – this situation is known as imprecise probabilities. A
general description of all possible imprecise probabilities requires using infinitely
many parameters. In practice, the two most widely used few-parametric approximate descriptions are p-boxes (bounds on the values of the cumulative distribution
function) and interval-valued moments (i.e., bounds on moments). In some situations, these approximations are not sufficiently accurate. So, we need more accurate
more-parametric approximations. In this paper, we explain what are the natural next
approximations.

1 How Decision Theory Describes Human Preferences: A Brief
Reminder
One of the main objectives of decision making theory is to help people make decisions. To be able to provide this help, we need to be able to take into account
people’s preferences.
A natural way to elicit preferences is to ask people to compare different alternatives and select the one which is, in their opinion, the most preferable. As a result, we
get a large number of pairs of alternatives (A, A0 ) in which the person preferred the
alternative A to the alternative A0 . However, directly dealing with such sets of pairs
is difficult. One of the main reasons for this difficulty is that computers have been
originally designed to process numbers, not discrete objects like sets of pairs, and
computers are still much more efficient in processing numbers than in processing
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other types of data. Thus, to enhance computer processing of people’s preferences,
it is desirable to describe these preferences by numbers.
Such a description is indeed possible, it is known as the utility approach; see,
e.g., [5, 8, 9, 13, 15]. In this approach, we select two fixed alternatives:
• a very bad alternative A− which is worse than anything that we will actually
encounter, and
• a very good alternative A+ which is better than anything that we will actually
encounter.
Then, for each number p from the interval [0, 1], we can form a lottery L(p) in
which:
• we get A+ with probability p and
• we get A− with the remaining probability 1 − p.
When p = 0, the lottery L(0) coincides with the very bad alternative A− and is, thus,
worse than any actual alternative A: L(0) < A. When p = 1, the lottery L(1) coincides with the very good alternative A+ and is thus, better than the actual alternative
A: A < A+ . The larger the probability p of the very good alternative, the better the
lottery L(p). So:
• if L(p) < A and p0 < p, then also L(p0 ) < A;
• similarly, if A < L(p) and p < p0 , then also A < L(p0 ).
So, when we compare the alternative A with lotteries L(p) corresponding to increasing values p, at some point, we switch from L(p) < A to A < L(p). Thus, for each
alternative A, there exists a threshold value p0 such that:
• for p < p0 , we have L(p) < A, while
• for p > p0 , we have A < L(p).
This threshold value can be formally defined as sup{p : L(p) < A} or, equivalently,
as inf{p : A < L(p)}. This threshold value is called the utility of the alternative A; it
is usually denoted by u(A).
By definition, for every ε > 0, we have
L(u(A) − ε) < A < L(u(A) + ε).
Since the value ε can be arbitrarily small, and in practice, we do not notice very
small differences, we can thus conclude that, from the practical purposes, the original alternative A is equivalent to the lottery L(u(A)). We will denote this practical
equivalence by A ≡ L(u(A)).
So, if we have several alternatives, we should select the one whose utility is the
largest.
Hence, to describe a person’s preferences, we can use the utility function that
assigns, to each alternative A, the utility u(A) of this alternative to this person.
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2 Which Action to Select: Discrete Case
How can use the utility-based description of preferences when making a decision?
In decision making, we need to select between several possible actions – including,
sometimes, an “action” of doing nothing. The difficulty is that usually, we cannot
exactly predict the consequences of each action: usually, several different consequences are possible.
For example, when we invest money in a new company, we may gain (if the
company prospers) or we may lose (if the company fails). When a medical doctor
prescribes a strong medicine to a patient, this may lead to the patient’s recovery –
or it may lead to the appearance of very bad side effects, which are, unfortunately,
possible for strong medicines.
Usually, we cannot predict the exact consequence of each action a, but, based
on the previous experience, we can estimate the probabilities p1 , . . . , pn of different
consequences A1 , . . . , An . Let u(Ai ) denote the utility of each of the possible consequences. By definition of utility, this means that each alternative Ai is equivalent to
a lottery L(u(Ai )) in which:
• we get A+ with probability u(Ai ) and
• we get A− with the remaining probability 1 − u(Ai ).
Thus, the action a is equivalent to a complex two-stage lottery, in which:
• first, we select one of the alternatives Ai with the corresponding probability pi ,
and then
• depending on which alternative Ai we selected on the first stage, we select either
A+ (with probability u(Ai )) or A− (with probability 1 − u(Ai )).
As a result of this two-stage lottery, we end up either with A+ or with A− . We can
use the formula of complete probability to find the probability u(a) of getting A+ :
u(a) = p1 · u(A1 ) + . . . + pn · u(An ).

(1)

Thus, the action a is equivalent to lottery in which we get A+ with probability u(a)
and A− with the remaining probability. By definition of utility, this means that the
utility of the action a is thus equal to u(a).
When selecting an action, we need to select the action with the largest possible
utility. The formula (1) for the action’s utility is exactly the formula for the expected
value of the utility. So, we can conclude that we need to select the action with the
largest value of the expected utility.

3 Which Action to Select: General Case
In general, each action can have infinitely many possible consequences: e.g., if we
give a strong medicine to a patient with fever, his resulting body temperature can
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take any value from normal to – in unfortunate cases – an even higher fever. In such
situations, we still need to compare expected values, but we now have an integral
instead of the sum:
Z
u(a) = ρ(x) · u(x) dx,
(2)
where ρ(x) is the probability density and u(x) is the utility of an alternative corresponding to the value x of the corresponding parameter (or parameters).

4 We Usually Know Probabilities With Some Uncertainty
Based on the finite sample of past experiences, we can only determine the corresponding distribution ρ(x) with some uncertainty. In other words, instead of a single
probability distribution with probability density ρ(x), we have a whole class P of
probability distributions which are consistent with our knowledge.
If two different distributions ρ1 (x) and ρ2 (x) are possible, this means that we can
also have a case in which:
• we have the first distribution ρ1 (x) with some probability α and
• we have the second distribution ρ2 (x) with the remaining probability 1 − α.
This case corresponds to the probability density function α · ρ1 (x) + (1 − α) · ρ2 (x),
a convex combination of the two original distributions. Thus, with every two distributions, the class P contains their convex combinations – i.e., the class P is convex.
For each utility function u(x), for different probability distributions from the class
P, we have, in general, different values of the utility u(a). In other words, instead a
single value u(a), we have a set of possible values. For a convex combination of two
distributions ρ1 , ρ2 ∈ P, the corresponding value u(a) is also a convex combination
of values u1 and u2 corresponding to the combined distributions. Thus, the set of
possible value is convex – and is, therefore, an interval [u(a), u(a)]. (It should be
mentioned that this interval can be infinite or semi-infinite.)
These intervals form a known alternative prevision-based representation of imprecise probabilities, when to each function u(x), we assign the interval of possible
values of u(a):


Z

[u(a), u(a)] =

ρ(x) · u(x) dx : ρ ∈ P ;

(3)

see, e.g., [2, 17].

5 How Can We Represent Imprecise Probabilities in Practice:
Usual Approaches of Interval-Valued Moments And P-Boxes
Ideally, we should store intervals (3) corresponding to all possible utility functions
u(x). However, there are very many different functions, and it is not possible to store
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all the corresponding intervals in a computer. We should therefore limit ourselves to
some few-parametric family of functions u(x).
Which functions should we choose? We should select functions u(x) corresponding to reasonable utilities. One class of such functions comes from the fact that usually, small changes in a parameter x leads to small changes in the alternative – and
thus, to small changes in the corresponding utility. In mathematical terms, it is reasonable to describe this idea by saying that u(x) smoothly depends on x. In many
such cases, we can expand this function in Taylor series and keep only a few first
terms in this expansion:
u(x) ≈ u0 + u1 · x + . . . + uk · xk .
For such functions, the expected value is simply a linear combination of the moments:
Z
ρ(x) · u(x) dx ≈ u0 + a1 · M1 + . . . + ak · Mk ,
def

where Mi = ρ(x) · xi dx. Thus, in such situations, to represent the probability distribution, it is sufficient to represent its moments M1 , . . . , Mk .
For imprecise probabilities, we do not know the exact moments, we only know
moments with some uncertainty, i.e., for each i, we only know the intervals [M i , M i ].
Such interval-valued moments are thus a natural way to present the corresponding
uncertainty. For the case when we have several parameters x = (x1 , . . . , xm ), we similarly need to store intervals of possible values of the joint moments
R

def

Mi1 ...im =

Z

im
ρ(x) · x1i1 · . . . · xm
dx.

Another important case is when we have an abrupt jump in utility for some value
x0 of the parameter x. For example, for a chemical plant:
• if the concentration of a potentially dangerous chemical in the air does not exceed
the required very small threshold x0 , we are OK, but
• if x > x0 , the plant will suffer from fines and possible closure – which drastically
decreases the corresponding utility.
In such cases, the utility function is approximately equal to a jump: u(x) = u− for
x < x0 and u(x) = u+ for x ≥ x0 . One can check that the resulting expected utility
is equal to u+ + (u− − u+ ) · F(x), where F(x), as usual, denotes the corresponding
value of the cumulative distribution function (cdf) – i.e., the probability that the
corresponding random variable does not exceed x. In such cases, to determine the
value of the expected utility, we need to know the values of the cdf F(x).
In case of uncertainty, we do not know the exact values of F(x). Instead, for each
x, we only know the bounds [F(x), F(x)] on F(x). Such interval-valued cdf is known
as the probability box, or a p-box, for short; see, e.g., [4].
In case of several variables, a natural idea is to describe similar bounds on the
joint pdf
def
F(x01 , . . . , x0m ) = Prob(x1 ≤ x01 & . . . & xm ≤ x0m );
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see, e.g., [14].

6 Data Processing under Interval-Valued Moments and p-Boxes
In both approaches, the information about the actual (unknown) probability density
function ρ(x) comes in the form of bounds on the corresponding integrals:
vi ≤

Z

ρ(x) · fi (x) dx ≤ xi ,

(4)

where:
• for moments, fi (x) = xi and
• for p-boxes, fi (x) = 1 for x < xi and fi (x) = 0 for all other x.
Based on this information, we need to estimate the value of the expected utility:
Z

ρ(x) · u(x) dx.

(5)

In other words, we need to find the smallest and the largest values of the objective
function (5) under constraints (4).
In some cases, there are explicit formulas for the corresponding smallest and
largest values; see, e.g., [4]. In general, we need to optimize the objective function
(5) (which is linear in terms of the unknowns ρ(x)) under constraints (4) which are
linear inequalities. Such problems of optimizing linear objective functions under
linear inequality constraints are known as linear programming problems. There exist
efficient algorithms for solving such problems; see, e.g., [3, 10, 16].

7 Need to Go Beyond p-Boxes and Interval-Valued Moments
p-boxes and interval-valued moments provide a reasonable first approximation to
the actual description of imprecise probabilities. In some cases, however, this approximation is not accurate enough. Let us explain why this can happen, on a simple
p-box example.
Indeed, suppose that we know that the probability distribution has the from
F(x) = F0 (x, c) for some family of functions F0 (x, c) and some (unknown) value
of the parameter c. As the simplest possible example, we can consider the family
e + c, where F(x)
e is a given function and the parameter c can take any
F0 (x, c) = F(x)
value from some reasonably narrow interval [−ε, ε].
In this case, for each x, the smallest possible value of the corresponding cdf is
e − ε and the largest possible value is F(x) = F(x)
e + ε. Thus, in the
F(x) = F(x)
p-box representation, the above uncertainty will be represented by the p-box
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e − ε, F(x)
e + ε].
[F(x), F(x)] = [F(x)
Let us now consider the following natural task: selecting a symmetric confidence
interval corresponding to a given confidence level 1 − α. In terms of the cumulative
density function, the requirement that a symmetric interval [−x0 , x0 ] is a confidence
interval with given confidence level means that
Prob(x ∈ [−x0 , x0 ]) = F(x0 ) − F(−x0 ) ≥ 1 − α.
The narrowest interval with this property is the interval for which
F(x0 ) − F(−x0 ) = 1 − α.
e + c. Thus,
In our case, we know that the cdf has the form F(x) = F(x)
e 0 ) − F(−x
e
F(x0 ) − F(−x0 ) = F(x
0 ),
and the desired requirement takes the form
e 0 ) − F(−x
e
F(x
0 ) = 1 − α.

(6)

But what will happen if we only use the information from the p-box? In this case,
the only information that we have about F(x0 ) is that
h
i
e 0 ) − ε, F(x
e 0) + ε
F(x0 ) ∈ F(x
and the only information that we have about F(−x0 ) is that
h
i
e
e
F(−x0 ) ∈ F(−x
0 ) − ε, F(−x0 ) + ε .
We have no information about the dependence between the values F(x0 ) and
F(−x0 ); thus, based on the p-box information, the only conclusion that we can
make about the difference F(x0 ) − F(−x0 ) is that this difference is somewhere in
the interval
h
 
 
 
i
e 0 ) − ε − F(−x
e
e 0 ) + ε − F(−x
e
F(x
=
0 ) + ε , F(x
0) − ε
h



i
e 0 ) − F(x
e 0 ) − 2ε, F(x
e 0 ) − F(x
e 0 ) + 2ε ;
F(x
see, e.g., [6, 11, 12].
The only way to guarantee that F(x0 ) − F(−x0 ) ≥ 1 − α is to require that the
smallest possible value of this difference is larger than or equal to 1 − α, i.e., that


e 0 ) − F(x
e 0 ) − 2ε ≥ 1 − α
F(x
or, equivalently, that
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e 0 ) − F(−x
e
F(x
0 ) ≥ 1 − (α − 2ε).
The narrowest possible symmetric interval for which we can provide such a guarantee is the interval for which
e 0 ) − F(−x
e
F(x
0 ) = 1 − (α − 2ε).

(7)

By comparing the formula (7) that comes from the p-box approximation with the
actual formula (6), we see that because of this approximation, we have to take an
interval that is much wider than necessary – namely, an interval corresponding to a
much larger confidence level 1 − (α − 2ε).
Such examples show that we need to go beyond p-boxes and interval-valued
moments. What are the natural next approximation?

8 Case of Interval-Valued Moments: What Are The Natural
Next Approximations?
In the moments method, we approximate the actual utility function by a polynomial
a0 + a1 · x + . . . + ak · xk . Thus, to get an adequate description of decision making
under the corresponding imprecise probability, we need to know, for each of these
polynomials, the range of the corresponding integrals.
Strictly speaking, there is no need to try all possible polynomials. First, The
term a0 just adds a constant to the expected utility, so it is sufficient to consider the
polynomials a1 · x + . . . + ak · xk . R
Second, if we know the integral u(x) · ρ(x) dx corresponding to a function u(x),
then, for every real number c, we can determine the integral
Z

uc (x) · ρ(x) dx
R

corresponding to the function uc (x) = c · u(x) as c · Ru(x) · ρ(x) dx. Thus, if we know
the range [u, u(a)] of possible values of the integral u(x) · ρ(x) dx, then:
• for each number c > 0, we can compute the range [uc , uc ] for the function uc (x)
as [uc , uc ] = [c · u, c · u], and
• for each number c < 0, we can compute the range [uc , uc ] for the function uc (x)
as [uc , uc ] = [c · u, c · u];
see, e.g., [6, 11, 12].
By multiplying each polynomial by an appropriate constant, we can always get
a1 = 1. Thus, it is sufficient to consider polynomials of the type
x + a2 · x2 + . . . + ak · xk .
So, a natural next approximation is to select some value k and to consider, for
all possible values of the parameters a = (a2 , . . . , ak ), the bounds M(a2 , . . . , ak ) and
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M(a2 , . . . , ak ) on the integral
Z



ρ(x) · x + a2 · x2 + . . . + ak · xk dx.

It is worth mentioning that for k = 2, we get linear combinations of the first and
second moments; a similar idea – known as the Elastic Net (EN) method – is very
successful in data processing; see, e.g., [1, 7, 18].
From the computational viewpoint, we are still Ok, since the corresponding constraints
Z


M(a2 , . . . , ak ) ≤ ρ(x) · x + a2 · x2 + . . . + ak · xk dx ≤ M(a2 , . . . , ak )
are still linear in terms of the unknowns ρ(x) and thus, we can still use efficient
linear programming algorithms to solve the corresponding computational problems.

9 Case of p-Boxes: What Are The Natural Next Approximations?
The use of p-boxes means we use bounds on the integrals ρ(x) · u(x) dx of the stepfunctions H(a − x) corresponding to different thresholds a, where H(x) is the Heaviside function which is:
• equal to 0 for negative x and
• 1 for non-negative x.
A natural idea is thus to consider bounds on the above integral for linear combinations of such step-functions, i.e., for functions of the type
u(x) = c1 · H(a1 − x) + c2 · H(a2 − x) + . . . + ck · H(ak − x).
Without losing generality, we can assume that a1 < a2 < . . . < ak . Such functions
are piece-wise constant:
•
•
•
•
•

for x ≤ a1 , we have u(x) = c1 + c2 + . . . + ck ;
for a1 < x ≤ a2 , we have u(x) = c2 + . . . + ck ;
...
for ak−1 < x ≤ ak , we have u(x) = ck ; and
for x > ak , we have u(x) = 0.

Vice versa, every piece-wise constant function can be represented in this form.
In particular, for k = 2, c1 = −1, and c2 = 1, we get the characteristic function of
the interval [a1 , a2 ] – thus, by considering such functions, we can find the exact confidence interval and hence, solve the problem with the p-boxes that we mentioned
in the previous sections.
Every function can be thus approximated. The larger k we take, the more accurate
the resulting description – and we can get any desired accuracy by selecting an
appropriate values k.
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Similarly to the previous section, we can multiply each such function by
1/c1 and thus, get the case when c1 = 1. Thus, we need to consider bounds
F(a1 , c2 , a2 , . . . , ck , ak ) and F(a1 , c2 , a2 , . . . , ck , ak ) on the integrals
Z

ρ(x) · (H(a1 − x) + c2 · H(a2 − x) + . . . + ck · H(ak − x)) dx =

(c1 + c2 + . . . + ck ) · Prob(x ≤ a1 ) + (c2 + . . . + ck ) · Prob(a1 < x ≤ a2 ) + . . . +
ck · Prob(ak−1 < x ≤ ak ).
The resulting constraints
F(a1 , c2 , a2 , . . . , ck , ak ) ≤
Z

ρ(x) · (H(a1 − x) + c2 · H(a2 − x) + . . . + ck · H(ak − x)) dx ≤
F(a1 , c2 , a2 , . . . , ck , ak )

are still linear in terms of the unknowns ρ(x). So, when processing this information,
we can still use efficient linear programming algorithms to solve the corresponding
computational problems.
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